The epistemology of disagreement is a fairly young though extremely fertile area of inquiry in philosophy. In recent years, a substantial amount of new work has been done on this topic, and the literature has developed in important ways. At the center of the debate is the question of what rationality requires one to do when faced with an epistemic peer with whom one disagrees. Two people are epistemic peers with respect to a particular question when they are roughly evidential and cognitive equals, that is, when they are (roughly) equally familiar with the evidence and arguments that bear on the question and are (roughly) equally competent, intelligent, and fair-minded in their assessment of it. Most discussions frame the issues in terms of those whom one takes to be an epistemic peer, rather than those who are in fact one’s epistemic peer (for ease of presentation, this distinction shall not be made explicit in what follows). This entry focuses on various answers that have been given to this question as well as related issues that emerge.
Estamos ansiosos por este lançamento, que deve solidificar ainda mais o debate em torno desta questão, a qual têm chamado a atenção de uma vasta gama de epistemólogos importantes (Kelly, Feldman, Elga, Christensen, Lackey, entre outros). Você encontra os tópicos do livro aqui. Mais informações, você encontra na página da Jennifer Lackey.